On the 12th of Tammuz 5687 (1927), the day the Previous Lubavitcher Rebbe was liberated from Communist prison, having been incarcerated for practicing Judaism under the most trying circumstances, he delivered a discourse
[1] in which he explained the three general categories of commandments: eidos, testimonies; mishpatim, laws; and chukim, decrees.
Eidos are those commandments that recall and/or testify to past events, such as Shabbos and Passover. Mishpatim are those commands that are also dictated by mortal understanding, such as honoring one's parents and the prohibition against stealing. Chukim are commands that have no rational basis or explanation.
As part of his clarification that chukim are not based on logic but are non-rational decrees ordained by G-d, the Rebbe brings the following proof: "As Rashi states (on the verse, 'This [law of the Red Heifer] is the chukah of the Torah'[2]) 'For Satan and the nations challenge Jews... "this is a decree ordained by Me; you may not question it.' "
Yet, Rashi mentions (prior to the Torah portion of Chukas) that chukim are non-rational decrees ordained by G-d. Why does the Rebbe specifically quote this Rashi?
The Rebbe does so in order to supply proof for something he states later in the discourse - that the performance of all mitzvos, the rational as well as the superational, ought to be motivated by kabbolas ol, the acceptance of the heavenly yoke upon oneself; all mitzvos are performed solely because G-d so decreed.
For the terminology, "This is the chukah of the Torah," indicates that the inexplicable decree of the Red Heifer is a foundation for the entire Torah.[3] Thus, the particulars of all mitzvos must be performed with the same kind of kabbolas ol with which one performs the commandment of the Red Heifer, for particulars derive from their general rule.
However, the question may be asked: The categories of testimonies, laws and decrees are divisions that the Torah itself sanctions; the Torah itself states that there are certain commandments that are non-rational, and others that are rational.
Thus, the Torah itself desires that "testimonies" be performed in a manner that testify to and recall past significant events; Torah itself desires that "laws" be performed because of their rational basis.[4] How, then, can we say that all mitzvos are to be performed with the same kabbolas ol as chukim?
In truth, however, rational commandments are performed because G-d decreed that they be performed; performing logical commandments is also a result of kabbolas ol.
Just as this is so regarding the manner of performance, so too regarding the mitzvos themselves: the Divine will that is clothed in "testimonies" and "laws" is intrinsically beyond reason. G-d, however, decreed that these mitzvos descend into the realm of logic as well.
But how can one expect to merge intellect with kabbolas ol and perform rational commandments rationally only because G-d has so decreed, when reason and kabbolas ol are essentially antithetical?
The Torah addresses this dilemma by stating: "This is the chukah of the Torah." The term chukah also derives from the Hebrew root that means "to hew out" - it permeates an individual through and through.[5]
Accepting the heavenly yoke upon oneself - chukah - so permeates an individual that every fiber of his being is infused with a sense of kabbolas ol, his intellect as well.
When an individual attains such a state, he will not experience the logic of rational commandments as an entity unto itself, but will recognize that the logic exists solely because G-d has so decreed.
Based on Likkutei Sichos, Vol. VIII, pp. 129-133
Notes:
- (Back to text) Titled "Havayah Li BeOzroi." Printed in Sefer HaMaamarim 5687, p. 201.
- (Back to text) Bamidbar 19:2.
- (Back to text) See Likkutei Torah, beginning of portion Chukas.
- (Back to text) See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. VII, p. 17ff.
- (Back to text) See maamar beginning Zos Chukas, 5665, p. 224.
The Torah portion of Chukas begins with the laws of the Parah Adumah, the Red Heifer, whose ashes were used to ritually purify a person who had come in contact with a dead body.
[1]
The Rambam states in Yad HaChazakah, Laws of Parah Adumah[2]: "Nine Parah Adumos were made from the time it was first commanded until the destruction of the Second Beis HaMikdash. Moshe made the first; Ezra the second; and seven more from the time of Ezra until the destruction of the Temple. The tenth will be made by Moshiach. May he be speedily revealed, Amen. May He so will it."
Yad HaChazakah is a book of laws, not a history book. What difference does it make from the perspective of Jewish law how many Parah Adumos were offered in previous generations? Moreover, why does the Rambam go on to add a prayer for the coming of Moshiach?
We must say that, by doing so, the Rambam is hinting at a matter of law, for it is customary for him to allude to matters of law through the exactitude of his terminology, and by prefacing one law with another.
With regard to the obligation to believe in the coming of Moshiach, the Rambam states:[3] "Whoever does not believe in him, or does not await his coming, denies not only [the statements of] the other prophets, but also [those of] the Torah and of Moshe, our teacher." In other words, mere belief in Moshiach's coming does not suffice, we are also obligated to hope for and await his arrival.
Moreover, this anticipation is to be in accordance with our thrice-daily recitation of the Amidah prayers: "Speedily cause the scion of David Your servant to flourish... for we hope for Your salvation all day."
This longing for the coming of Moshiach arises from the Jews' feeling that, as long as Moshiach has not arrived, they are incomplete.
In light of the above, it is clear that when an individual who eagerly awaits Moshiach mentions something in conjunction with him, then even if there is only a peripheral connection, his longing will be roused. Thus, it becomes a personal need for which one is obligated to pray.[4] Consequently, the Jew prays that he witness Moshiach's arrival as speedily as possible.
By inserting the prayer "May he be speedily revealed, Amen. May He so will it," and moreover, by doing so at the earliest appropriate opportunity, the Rambam emphasizes how intense should be the "anticipation of his arrival"; as soon as an opportunity presents itself, even if the connection is only casual, a Jew should be aroused to pray "May he be speedily revealed, Amen. May He so will it."
Since all aspects of Torah are precise, it follows that there is a conceptual relationship between the laws of the Parah Adumah and the coming of Moshiach. This is why the Rambam mentions the awaiting of Moshiach's arrival in the laws of Parah Adumah, although the Moshiach is mentioned in Yad HaChazakah before the laws of the Parah Adumah.
The relationship between the laws of the Parah Adumah and the coming of Moshiach is as follows: Exile is related to the concept of ritual defilement - coming in contact with spiritual death. For the exile came about through iniquities - the element of "You who cleave unto G-d your L-rd are all alive today"[5] was lacking.
The ashes of the Parah Adumah, offering purification from the defilement of death, allude to the time of Moshiach's coming, the time of redemption from exile, when Jews sunder their bonds with spiritual death, for they then all cleave to G-d and are thus vitally alive.
May Moshiach come and redeem us speedily in our days. In the words of the Rambam: "May he be speedily revealed, Amen. May He so will it."
Based on Likkutei Sichos, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 131-137
Notes:
- (Back to text) Bamidbar, ch. 19.
- (Back to text) Conclusion of ch. 3.
- (Back to text) Hilchos Melachim 11:1.
- (Back to text) See Rambam Hilchos Tefillah 1:2.
- (Back to text) Devarim 4:4. See also Avos d'Rav Nossan 34:6.
Korach